

# DUNMAN HIGH MODEL ASEAN PLUS SUMMIT



6 - 8 June 2019

Study Guide

## UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

1. The Question of the Cuban Missile Crisis
2. The Question of the Congo Crisis





# INTRODUCTION

## THE QUESTION OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) was a 13-day political and military standoff in October 1962 which arose from the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, approximately 90 miles (~162 kilometres) south of the United States of America (USA).

The crisis was made known to the American public via a television address on October 22, 1962, by then-President John F. Kennedy who mentioned the presence of the missiles and explained his decision to enact a naval blockade around the island. President Kennedy then made it extremely clear that the USA was fully equipped to neutralize the threat via military force, hence bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war.

The crisis could be considered to have begun on Monday, October 14, 1962, when a lone U-2 spy plane soared over western Cuba, taking 928 photographs of the island some 72'500 feet below. Within 24 hours, photo interpreters from the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) noticed and identified multiple SS-4 medium-range ballistic missiles deployed in the vicinity of the town of San Cristobal. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy informed the President of the deployments the very next day. However, while the USA intelligence collection appeared to be comprehensive, persistent and effective, the six-month-long secret operation to install Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba went unnoticed and the ballistic missiles were in Cuba for a whole five weeks before USA intelligence discovered them.

Relations between Cuba and the USA were strained by multiple tit-for-tat incidents and culminated in the economic embargo of Cuba and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. The failed invasion created the perception that President Kennedy was indecisive and as one Soviet advisor wrote: "too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations... too intelligent and too weak." Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was then emboldened to achieve a balance of power in the region, after the USA placed multiple Jupiter-class ballistic missiles in Turkey, by placing their own missiles in Cuba.

To understand the rationale behind the decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, one has to go further back in history to 1959 when leftist revolutionary leader Fidel Castro aligned himself with the Soviet Union. With the end of World War 2 and the start of the Cold War, the USA had grown increasingly concerned about the expansion of communism. Having a Latin American country openly allying with the Soviet Union was regarded by the USA as unacceptable. The Western Hemisphere must be under the USA's sphere of influence according to the Monroe Doctrine.

Delegates must keep several things in mind as they approach the topic at hand. First and foremost, the Cold War context looms over Cuba as both superpowers only have their national and strategic interests at heart and perhaps, not the good of the world. Secondly, the threat of nuclear war does not restrict itself to the Latin American region, delegates ought to note that both the USA and USSR have the nuclear capability to end the world as we know it in 1962, hence the need for a concerted global effort to defuse the situation. Last but not least, delegates need to solve the issue as only the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) could while navigating the Cold War politics within the United Nations (UN).



# DEFINITIONS

## **1. Naval Quarantine:**

The interdiction of a nation's lines of communication at sea (including sea lanes or sea traffic) through the usage of naval power, typically used as an attempt to cut off supplies, war materiel and communications from a particular area.

## **2. Monroe Doctrine:**

A policy in the USA of opposing European Colonialism in the Americas beginning in 1823; it stated that any efforts by European nations to take control of any independent state in North or South America would be viewed as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. The Monroe Doctrine was invoked in the Cold War to prevent the spread of Soviet-backed Communism in Latin America. Under this rationale, the USA provided intelligence and military aid to Latin and South American governments that claimed or appeared to be threatened by Communist subversion. The Monroe Doctrine was the grounds on which the USA confronted the Soviet Union over the installation of Soviet ballistic missiles on Cuban soil.

## **3. PGM-19 Jupiter:**

The PGM-19 Jupiter was the first medium-range ballistic missile of the USA with an operational range of 1500 miles (2400 km). It was armed with a 1.44 megaton nuclear warhead and was accurate up to 0.5 miles (~800 m) which made it the ideal missile to strike high-value targets like bridges, railway yards or troop concentrations.

## **4. R-12 Dvina (SS-4 Sandal):**

The R-12 was a theatre ballistic missile developed and deployed by the USSR during the Cold War. It provided the USSR with the capability to attack targets at ranges less than 2200 miles (3500 km) with a megaton-class thermonuclear warhead. The R-12 was, therefore, the bulk of the Soviet missile threat to Western Europe.

## **5. Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD):**

A WMD is any nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, or any other weapon which can kill and bring significant harm to a large number of humans or cause great damage to human-made structures or natural structures or the biosphere. Coined with reference to aerial bombing with chemical explosives in WW2, it has come to refer to any large-scale weaponry of other technologies particularly of the chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) nature.



# DEFINITIONS

## **6. Brinkmanship:**

Brinkmanship is the practice of trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the brink of active conflict. The manoeuvre of pushing a situation with the opponent to the brink succeeds by forcing the opponent to back down and make concessions. This might be achieved through diplomatic manoeuvres to create the perception that one is willing to use extreme methods rather than concede.

## **7. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)**

Mutually assured destruction is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and defender. It is based on the theory of deterrence which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons. It hence creates an equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to neither initiate a conflict nor disarm.

## **8. First Strike capabilities:**

In nuclear strategy, a first strike is a preemptive surprise attack employing overwhelming force. It refers to the country's ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its nuclear arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation while the opposing side can no longer wage war.

## **9. Second Strike capabilities:**

In nuclear strategy, a second strike is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a powerful nuclear retaliation. It is considered vital as a form of nuclear deterrence as to have such ability and to convince the opponent of its viability will deter the other side to try and win a nuclear war in one massive first strike. Such a strategy usually results in a mutually assured destruction defence strategy where neither side will be willing to attack first.

# HISTORICAL PROGRESSIONS

16 February 1959	Fidel Castro was sworn in as Prime Minister of Cuba.
3 October 1960	The USA placed an economic embargo to Cuba prompting a total of 549 private-run businesses to have their premises seized and nationalised in Cuba.
September 1960	<p>Castro attends the General Assembly of the United Nations. The first meeting between Castro and Nikita Khrushchev, both issued a public condemnation of the poverty and racism faced by Americans in areas like Harlem.</p> <p>Relations were observed to be warm between the two leaders as they led the applause to one another's speeches at the General Assembly.</p> <p>Castro also meets with Polish First Secretary Władysław Gomułka, Bulgarian chairman Todor Zhivkov, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru. Castro also received an evening's reception from the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.</p>
16 December 1960	The USA ends import quota of Cuban sugar.
January 1961	<p>Castro orders Havana's USA Embassy to reduce its 300 member staff. The USA responds by ending diplomatic relations and increasing funding for exiled dissidents.</p> <p>President Kennedy first briefed on Operation Pluto, a ship-borne invasion at Trinidad, Cuba about 270km south-east of Havana. Kennedy authorized the active departments to continue and report on progress.</p>
04 April 1961	President Kennedy briefed on and approved the Bay of Pigs plan (Operation Zapata). The invasion landing area was changed to beaches bordering the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) in Las Villas. 150km south-east of Havana and east of the Zapata Peninsula.
09 April 1961	Forward elements of Brigade 2506 began transport from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas.
17 – 21 April 1961	Bay of Pigs invasion launched and foiled. Soviet advisors note that Kennedy unable to handle crisis and deem him too weak.
29 May 1962	Soviet military officials enter Havana amidst a delegation of agricultural experts. Operation ANADYR was approved by both parties.
08 September 1962	First Soviet ships arrive in Cuba. Foreign news reporters and embassy staff were forbidden to travel outside Havana. Cuban agents repeatedly harassed foreigners, especially British embassy officials. All Cubans were barred from
October 1962	<p>41,900 Soviet personnel arrived in Cuba. Approximately 120 nuclear charges were delivered to Cuba and installed on various warheads.</p> <p>A massive disinformation campaign was underway as thousands of reports flooded USA Intelligence and the CIA could barely filter through the reports. SIGINT began discounting massive amounts of reports including ones about Russian troops in fatigue as well as massive missile carriers knocking down telephone poles, mailboxes and peasant shacks.</p>



# HISTORICAL PROGRESSIONS

14 October 1962	USA U2 Spy-plane flew over San Cristobal and snapped 928 photographs containing information about a possible missile deployment.
15 October 1962	National Photographic Interpretation Agency (NPIA) submitted reports detailing multiple sites confirmed to be holding missile launch bays and holds.
16 October 1962	The Executive Committee (Ex-Comm) met for the first time to discuss the possibility of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
17 October 1962	NPIA submits another report showing clear evidence of SS-4 missiles in Cuba.
18 October 1962	Attorney General Robert Kennedy kept a previously scheduled meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko but does not mention the missiles. Gromyko tells Kennedy that the only help the Soviet Union is giving to Cuba is assistance growing crops and missiles that are only for defence.
19 October 1962	Ex-Comm met and discussed sending U.S. ships to Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from reaching the island.
20 October 1962	Robert Kennedy told the president that Ex-Comm recommended a quarantine.
22 October 1962	DEFCON levels were adjusted to DEFCON 3.  President Kennedy gave a speech that is carried live on television stations across the country to inform Americans that missiles have been discovered in Cuba.
23 October 1962	Khrushchev ordered Soviet ships on their way to Cuba to stop in the Atlantic about 750 miles away. Soviet submarines trailed behind the U.S. ships as they moved into place.
24 October 1962	Khrushchev refused to remove the missiles from Cuba. He accused Kennedy of putting the world at risk of nuclear war by ordering the quarantine.
25 October 1962	DEFCON levels adjusted to DEFCON 2 – the highest ever in US history. President Kennedy ordered flights over Cuba to be increased from once to twice per day. Pilots also prepared to begin night flights as the U.S. monitors the Cuban missiles. USA's nuclear-capable long-range bombers began long-range sorties.



# KEY STAKEHOLDERS

## **United States of America (USA):**

By invoking the Monroe Doctrine, the USA has made clear its intention to restrict any attempts by any country or powers to undermine its sphere of influence within Latin America. In the Cold War context, the USA needs to stop what she perceives to be a consistent and dangerous spread of Communist influence and buildup in the Latin American region.

The USA has a commitment to the rest of the free world to defend them and if they prove unable to defend its own backyard from the Soviet threat, the confidence placed in her to defend Western Europe in particular and the rest of the world in general from the Communist threat will be severely undermined.

Bearing the shame of the embarrassing failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy administration now finds itself desperately in need of a win to restore confidence in the USA and bolster support among the American people in view of the 1962 midterm elections and avoid proving the Soviet administration's perception of a weak American government right.

## **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)**

The Cold War was not going well for the USSR and her Communist allies. As of May 1962, the USSR only had 20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of targeting mainland USA from within its own borders. The USA was therefore deemed to have the upper hand in terms of First Strike capabilities.

The Soviet nuclear strategy, therefore, revolved around medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and moving said missiles to locations where they could reach the contiguous United States. After the deployment of the highly accurate Jupiter missiles to Turkey, the Soviets needed to shift the balance of power back to its advantage and deter Western countermeasures in Europe through the MAD strategy.

Hence, placing the missiles in Cuba gave the Soviets three distinct benefits. Firstly, an assured second-strike capability which is a severe threat to the USA; secondly, it was a way for Khrushchev to assert his political dominance over his rivals and critics who deem him too soft in his dealings with the Americans. Lastly, assisting Cuba will allow it to gain an ally right in the USA's doorstep.

Beyond all of the tangible benefits, the USSR stands to gain multiple potential advantages as well. The Kennedy administration was seen as weak and lacking resolve to deal with the USSR and through the deployment of missiles, they can gauge the extent to which they can push the limits of the USA. This was especially so as the USA's limits were never tested and the Kennedy administration was new.



# KEY STAKEHOLDERS

## **Republic of Cuba**

Cuba was at the centre of the conflict, with the Soviets equipping Cuba with nuclear missiles. Cuba's main objectives were to ensure the longevity of Castro's rule and the survival of the newly socialist state. America historically had a huge amount of vested interest in Cuba, owing to the fact that America had pumped millions of dollars into Cuba prior to the hostile power grasp by Castro. Castro's domestic anti-Capitalist and anti-US policy meant the eradication of anything American, including America's rights in Guantanamo Bay, or millions of dollars in American investments. This only further enraged her powerful neighbor, resulting in Cuba having to seek assistance from allies in order to protect her security.

In addition, being a “red” state next to a powerful Capitalist country meant that it was under constant threat by her neighbour. Such a mindset is seen in transcripts of conversations between USSR and her ally, Cuba, on the direct threat America posed. As such, Cuba, in a bid to bolster her defence against the US, requested assistance from the USSR in the form of nuclear weapons. This move aimed to counterbalance the threat posed by the US.





# SCOPE OF DEBATE

## **Nuclear Armageddon:**

Throughout the guide, multiple references to different strategies have been made, including but not limited to First Strike, Second Strike, MAD and Brinkmanship. Delegates have to understand that such strategies are based on the principle of Balance of Power where there is a consistent effort by both sides in the Cold War to offset any perceived advantage the opposing side holds over themselves. This means that the superpowers and their allies consistently create bigger and stronger weaponry in order to ensure the validity of their insurance.

As members of the United Nations Security Council, delegates must face the fact that the world's nuclear arsenal and strategies have the potential to wipe out life as they know it on Earth. Delegates must, therefore, race against time to ensure the world is brought back from the brink of nuclear war. Delegates can also rally together to force the world to stop resorting to nuclear strategies in order to muscle some form of concession in the diplomatic circle and instead settle matters peacefully and amicably.

## **International jurisdiction:**

Without a doubt, the conflict mostly revolves around the two superpowers. However, some questions remain unanswered. An example of which is whether the installation of nuclear arms in Cuba was simply a Cuba arming itself to better defend against the repeated threat posed by the USA.

Delegates are advised that both the USA and Cuba wrote letters to call for the meeting of the United Nations on 22 October 1962 and the USSR followed suit on 23 October 1962. The USA called the council's attention to the buildup of offensive nuclear weaponry deployed in Cuba while Cuba referred to the USA's actions as an act of war. The USSR however, raised the violation of the UN Charter and the threat of peace caused by the USA's acts of piracy out at sea.

Understanding the United Nations was relatively new and still evolving to meet the changing face of global diplomacy and politics. Delegates should, therefore, decide whether the UN can or should actually intervene, which letters will the council consider and what kind of intervention the council can actually decide to partake in.




# KEY GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. Are the actions undertaken by the superpowers wholly justified?
2. Is the arming of Cuba with nuclear missiles just a part of their national militarisation?
3. Can the UNSC (and by extension, the UN) do anything to manage the crisis even though the security interests of the superpowers are at stake?
4. How can the UNSC mitigate the use of nuclear strategies and pull the world back from the brink of war?



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# INTRODUCTION

## THE QUESTION OF THE CONGO CRISIS

The crisis began in early 1960, a mere few days after the country of Congo was granted independence from Belgium. It was sparked off by a multitude of factors, but at its very core, was attributed to its inherent lack of stability as a country fresh into independence, being left with little to no political tutelage or any sort of aid from Belgium. Following independence was a series of tragic events, all woven with their own complications, including riots, attempts at secession, and the loss of countless innocent lives, which we will discuss further into this study guide.

As delegates of the UNSC grapple with the Congo Crisis, there are many factors to consider.

Given the lack of preparation when it came to dealing with the independence they had demanded, in conjunction with the secession that Katanga and South Kasai sought for, delegates are expected to take into consideration the lack of political, social and economic stability in Congo beginning in 1960. In that vein, delegates should then strongly consider the use of diplomacy and the many functions of the UNSC to help Congo gain her footing as a nascent country.

Issues such as divisions along ethnic, political and Cold War lines are important reasons for delegates to bear in mind when looking at what caused the breakdown of Congo internally. Moreover, there were external pressures, exerted namely by the superpowers at that point in time, that could have exacerbated the crisis. Located in Central Africa, it is also important to think about how the crisis in Congo would affect or spread to the rest of the continent, and how the council can go about containing the harms of this crisis as much as possible.

At face value, the Congo Crisis is one that seems very much localised to the continent of Africa. However, delegates must remember that this crisis was also a Cold War proxy conflict, where Congo's involvement would be able to directly or indirectly further escalate the Cold War, where global security is concerned. Bearing in mind that international peacekeeping was a relatively new concept in 1962, delegates must review the whole notion of peacekeeping, and are to decide whether the use of force by the UN is justified, as well as to what extent said force should be used. Above all, delegates must determine how the UN should approach the Congo Crisis, and whether or not direct intervention is necessary.

As such, the United Nations Security Council will be set on 24 December 1962, when ONUC troops and Katangese troops began to fight. In this critical point in time, delegates must decide wisely how to tackle the multiple facets of the crisis in order to successfully achieve stability within the Republic of the Congo.



# DEFINITIONS

## **Resolution 143**

In light of Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations and of the newly-independent Republic of the Congo's request, Resolution 143, effective from 14 July 1960, was a resolution by the United Nations Security Council that was essentially issued to provide military assistance of peacekeeping nature to the Republic of the Congo, with the purpose of ensuring security in the nation.

## **Resolution 169**

Recalling Resolution 143, Resolution 169 by the Security Council was a resolution that, in summary, expressed disapproval of the attempted secession of Katanga and aimed to provide military support to the Republic of Congo against the aforementioned province.

## **United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)**

With the initial goals of supporting the withdrawal of Belgium military (and later mercenaries) and restoring security through military support in Congo, as well as the eventual goals of preservation of Congo's interests and protecting Congo from civil war, the ONUC, or Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, was the first United Nations' mission with a notable military force that was formed after Resolution 143 by the United Nations Security Council.

## **Mouvement National Congolais (MNC)**

Directly translating to Congolese National Movement, the MNC was a major political party formed in 1958 with the aim of attaining independence for the former Belgian Congo.

## **Republic of the Congo (Congo-Leopoldville)**

Not to be confused with the neighbouring country also known as Republic of the Congo but commonly known as Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville is the former Belgian Congo and present Democratic Republic of the Congo.

# HISTORICAL PROGRESSIONS

<p>1958 October</p>	<p><b>Establishment of Movement National Congolais (MNC)</b></p> <p>Eventually becoming the largest, and leading nationalist party in Belgian Congo, the establishment of the MNC would ultimately help spearhead the demanding of independence from Belgium.</p>
<p>1959 4 January</p>	<p><b>Leopoldville Riots</b></p> <p>The riots occurred as a result of the Alliance des Bakongo's (ABAKO) misinterpretation of the warning from the Belgian authorities to keep the rally unpolitical. As the ABAKO leaders attempted to ease the crowd, violence broke out. Though a tragic occurrence with a large number of casualties, the riots, however, also resulted in widespread influence of the nationalist parties beyond major cities, and set a precedent for even more riots and protests for independence to erupt throughout the rest of the year.</p> <p>After the Leopoldville riots, many Africans began to throw the colonial system in disarray by disobeying the law.</p>
<p>1960 30 June</p>	<p><b>Belgian Congo Gains Independence to become Republic of the Congo</b></p> <p>The Belgian government agreed to most of the requests made by the Congolese government, in fear of an uprising.</p> <p>Known as "Le Pari Congolais" or the Congolese bet, the Belgian leaders had high hopes for the Republic of the Congo, in spite of her unreadiness and the minimal number of highly educated in the country, which meant that they were left with few potential leaders who were insufficiently prepared.</p>
<p>1960 11 July</p>	<p><b>Katanga Secession</b></p> <p>Moise Tshombe decides to announce on 11 July 1960, that Katanga would be seceding from the Republic of the Congo, forming the independent State of Katanga. The secession was not looked favourably upon by Congo's leaders, seeing as Katanga was a province with stronger relations with Northern Rhodesia and the mining region she possessed.</p>
<p>1960 8 August</p>	<p><b>Kasai Secession</b></p> <p>Soon, the region of Kasai also announced her secession with effect from 8 August 1960, forming the Mining State of Kasai. The leaders of Congo were alarmed. With both Katanga and Kasai becoming separated from Congo, 40% of Congo's revenue was lost.</p>

# HISTORICAL PROGRESSIONS

<p>1960 14 July</p>	<p><b>Adoption of Resolution 143</b></p> <p>The UN called for the removal of Belgium troops from the Republic of Congo for two main reasons. Firstly, due to the unease regarding the support of secessionist states, and secondly, due to the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld's, belief that this was an opportunity for the UN to establish itself as a major proponent of world peace. Thus, the UN adopted Resolution 143, calling for the replacement of Belgium troops with UN troops effective from 14 July 1960.</p>
<p>1960 25 August</p>	<p><b>Lumumba and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)</b></p> <p>On August 25 1960, Hammarskjöld discovered that Lumumba had received soviet military support. On this fateful day, soldiers also began killing civilians mindlessly, as the disorder in Kasai got out of hand.</p> <p>It was on this day that Hammarskjöld began to believe that Lumumba was a threat to the UN and its efforts in assisting in the Congo Crisis.</p>
<p>1960 5 September</p>	<p><b>President's Dismissal of the Prime Minister</b></p> <p>The Western countries felt the escalating pressure to remove Lumumba from power due to his bid for Soviet support. Tshombe and Kalonji also attempted to convince Kasavubu to contend with Lumumba's centralism with his moderation and federalism.</p> <p>Rationalising with the massacres of South Kasai and bearing the promise of American backing, Kasavubu announced on 5 September 1960 that he had dismissed Lumumba. Lumumba attempted to dismiss Kasavubu in retaliation but failed to garner enough support, inciting a constitutional crisis.</p>
<p>1960 14 September</p>	<p><b>The New Government</b></p> <p>Mobutu was pressured by many groups of people, comprising of but not limited to Lumumba, Kasavubu, and the United States. Decisively or possibly otherwise, he ordered his troops to overthrow both Lumumba and Kasavubu, instituting a new governing authority.</p>

# HISTORICAL PROGRESSIONS

<p>1961 17 January</p>	<p><b>Death of the Prime Minister</b></p> <p>Lumumba had been placed under house arrest, when he fled to Stanleyville in hopes of gathering supporters. However, he was pursued and recaptured by Mobutu's troops. Tormented, Lumumba was sent to Thysville and later, Katanga, where he was placed under the care of Tshombe's forces. Soon on 17 January, Katangese forces killed Lumumba. It was said that President Tshombe and two other ministers, along with four Belgian officers, were present at the execution.</p>
<p>1961 13 September</p>	<p><b>Peacekeeping Operation Gone Wrong</b></p> <p>The ONUC was mandated to detain foreign mercenaries on sight as part of Operation Morthor, and in a bid to do so peacefully, the ONUC unintentionally instigated a fire fight, which resulted in the Siege of Jadotville, when Katangese troops fought against Irish ONUC troops, who eventually surrendered and were held captive as prisoners of war.</p>
<p>1961 18 September</p>	<p><b>Aviation Accident</b></p> <p>Hammarskjöld was on a plane to Ndola, where he was going to negotiate a ceasefire between UN and Katangese troops. However, the plane crashed, killing everyone on board including Hammarskjöld himself.</p> <p>U Thant, who succeeded him, preferred a different approach in dealing with the conflict, which involved direct intervention, contrary to the moderation that guided Hammarskjöld's decisions.</p>
<p>1961 22 September</p>	<p><b>Succession Crisis</b></p> <p>While trying to decide on a successor to replace Hammarskjöld, the USSR pushed for a troika to take the position of the Secretary-General instead. This meant that there would be three leaders, each from one of the three worlds, which was much preferred by the USSR given that they believed there to be strong pro-Western bias in the handling of the Congo Crisis under Hammarskjöld.</p>





# HISTORICAL PROGRESSIONS

<p>1961 24 November</p>	<p><b>Issuing of Resolution 169</b></p> <p>With the issuing of Resolution 169, the ONUC was deployed to alleviate the situation in Congo. In spite of this, the Katangese troops continued to incite chaos, which instigated the ONUC to launch Operation Unokat in order to establish dominance in Katanga.</p>
<p>1962 24 December</p>	<p><b>Fighting Between UN Troops and Katangese</b></p> <p>Tshombe signed the Kitona Declaration under the influence of the international community, but the talks with Cyrille Adoula that succeeded the signature of the declaration met an impasse, as Katangese and ONUC troops continued to fight.</p>



# SCOPE OF DEBATE

## **Justifiability of UN use of force - Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)**

It must be first recognised that ONUC was created in response to official approaches by Lumumba and Kasavubu to request aid to counter the external aggression by Belgian troops, rather than any sort of internal restoration. Thus, any use of force should first, above all, be able to address the issue raised by the Congolese leaders.

In addition, delegates would have to reconcile the main, normative objective of ONUC - to protect the Congo's sovereignty, and the UN norm of neutrality and non-intervention. In Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it is stated that the two exceptions to the article are firstly, the use of Force to exercise the right to self defence and secondly, the use of Force by the UNSC to restore international peace and security. It is thus important to exercise discernment in determining what the instances of discretion/exception would look like, in order to avoid any inconsistencies in subsequent action taken. The use of Force by the UN in any situation holds the power to set a precedent for how much Force can be used in the following operation. Therefore, issues such as characterising proportionate use of force and rules of engagement between the peacekeeping troops and those on the ground should be given significant consideration. The reputation of the UN hinges on the use of Force by UNOC, as it not only would determine how the crisis plays out, but also the number of lives lost.

## **Impact of the Cold War context**

Upon the introduction of the Cold War context into the Congo crisis, the UN found themselves in an even greater dilemma, having to balance Cold War tensions between the USA and the USSR while handling the crisis. The two superpowers took substantial action in order to forward their own Cold War agenda of establishing influence over Congo. This manifested in measures such as military assistance that was supplied to Patrice Lumumba by the Soviet Bloc, as well as the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, allegedly plotted by the USA as they suspected he was aligned with the communists.

The tension between the USA and USSR also heavily manifested itself in conflict within the UN through veto powers. An example of this is the resolution that authorised ONUC, which resulted in major disagreement about the first operative paragraph of the resolution, between the socialist bloc (USSR, Poland, Tunisia, Ecuador, and Ceylon) and the colonial powers (USA, Britain, France and Italy). As a result, the resolution was passed despite the UNSC not clearly establishing their position on the issue of conditionality, i.e. whether Belgian withdrawal was dependent on the UN guarantee of law and order.



# SCOPE OF DEBATE

Despite the Cold War tensions causing a divide within the council, it must be recognised that the UN would eventually still have to come to a decision regarding the actions taken and this would likely mean picking a side between the two superpowers, under the extreme pressure of both sides to conform to their perspectives or interests. Therefore, the UN is fully liable to accusations of bias. Delegates are reminded to be cognisant of the fact that they are walking a fine line, and should consider the role of the UNSC in conflict resolution, taking into account the interests of the different players to strike a balance that can ultimately aid the resolution of the crisis.

## **Compromise on the UN's non-intervention principle**

Insofar as direct UN intervention appears as a swift and decisive manner to solve the conflict, delegates should consider the nature of the UN and its inherently non-interventionist mandate. Ostensibly, the crisis necessitates some form of intervention in order to not undermine Congo's sovereignty and territorial integrity; there is a need to achieve some extent of normative change in the UN's approach to the issue at hand. In addition, these changes would need to be justified and characterised by the council in terms of the nature of this intervention, whether it be conflict, non-conflict or indirect, and the logistical challenges to any possible intervention. It is important for delegates to determine whether the way in which Hammarskjöld dealt with the Congolese claims that the Katanga secession was instigated by the Belgians was impartial or not. This would affect how representative of the Secretary-General's sentiments the council's actions would be, and subsequently prompt a response from the council. Ultimately, the council would need to reconcile with the fundamental notion that ONUC undermines UN's non-intervention policy and the need for intervention in this crisis, as well as determining whether complete impartiality would still be a feasible baseline to operate by.



# KEY STAKEHOLDERS

## **Republic of the Congo (ROC or Congo-Leopoldville)**

The ROC was new to the concept of independence, and was especially unprepared to face the challenges that lay ahead. Congo was struck with internal violence and mutinies, which consequently triggered areas like Katanga and South Kasai to begin secession proceedings in order to escape the chaos and keep their resources exclusively to themselves. This resulted in political disintegration and posed an economic threat to the Congo as both areas were rich in minerals that generated a substantial amount of export revenue for the country.


The political tensions in the country were centred around the tensions between Mobutu, Kasavubu and Lumumba which resulted in a constitutional crisis and a split in the government. The lack of unity in the country both among its regions and its leaders resulted in a divided and chaotic Congo, which made it close to impossible for the country to engage in any form of post-colonial rebuilding or development.

On top of the internal factors that made nation rebuilding challenging, Congo was also a pawn of the superpowers, the US and the USSR, whom, disguised as helping hands in the crisis, were striving to fulfil their Cold War agendas of establishing influence in areas that were especially malleable at the point in time. In that vein, the crisis could be looked at as a proxy war and it would be thus important to also consider how to ensure local welfare in this international tug-of-war.

Though seemingly unimportant, delegates are to note the difference between Congo-Leopoldville and Congo-Brazzaville. Though both countries are similar in culture and have experienced significant political turmoil, Congo-Brazzaville had less of a stake in the Congo Crisis due to her being formerly colonised by France rather than Belgium, resulting in very separate identities.

## **Belgium**

Local armies had mutinied not long after Congo's independence and the Belgians were quick to deploy paratroopers to intervene for the purpose of maintaining law and order, as well as to protect the white civilians. It is important to note that this intervention was conducted without the state's permission. Consequently, from 10 to 18 July, the Belgian forces had intervened 28 times in Congo localities, most of which were without state permission as well, restoring order through the use of the gendarmerie. This drew the ire of local leaders such as Lumumba and Kasavubu, since the interventions meant an outright violation of the Treaty of Friendship between the two parties.



# KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Belgium also still took economic interest in Congo and in particular, Katanga, and thus strengthened its military bases there in a bid to not lose their former colony. These economic interests were derived from the fact that Katanga was a key producer of industrial minerals – the United States, United Kingdom and Belgium had established trilateral trade agreements and worked together to develop these ores and minerals as a source of commercial energy power. In interest of those economic privileges, Belgium saw the need to keep Congo close, despite already granting them independence. This would therefore shape Belgium's role in the crisis, as they provided aid in support of Katanga's secession, an event that would result in the escalation of the crisis as a whole.

## **Britain**

Britain felt strongly about centering its Congo policy around their agenda for decolonisation in Africa, which included protecting its own economic interests and networks in Katanga. Then Prime Minister Roy Welensky believed that the secession was actually beneficial to British interests in the region, and it was this position that shaped Britain's Congo policies and stance against the use of force to intervene in the secession. As a result, Britain's stance on the issue often clashed with the USA's support for military intervention by ONUC to quash the secession. The British position on the crisis would, in the escalation of things, present itself as avoidant and even dissonant due to their intransigence towards using UN forces to end the secession and even debating about the issue at all, as seen in their repeated appeals for a moratorium on further discussion of the Congo issue to keep it off the UN agenda. The stark disparities in Britain's agenda relative to the USA can also be seen to have hampered the effectiveness of the UN efforts to end the unrest.

## **United States of America (USA)**

Apart from their economic interests in Congo, with Katanga being a source of uranium used in the American atomic energy programme, USA had to bear in mind her desire to gain supremacy over the USSR and to prevent communist outreach (and in fact viewed the most part of the crisis with a Cold War lens). Due to these vested interests, the USA took a strong stance on this issue and actively sought to re-establish dominance over the UN. This resulted in the aforementioned clashes in USA and Britain's view of how the secession should be dealt with, and also emphasised fundamental fault lines that would threaten Western unity. The USA would thus need to grapple with and reconcile the importance of maintaining Western unity and advancing its own agenda, be it Cold War or economic interests.



# KEY STAKEHOLDERS

## **Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)**

It is important to note that the USSR was at a disadvantage in the Cold War. As a superpower due to her nuclear arsenal, the USSR was still a middle-income country with depleting resources, competing against a wealthier, more influential one.

To the Soviet bloc, the unrest in Congo was an opportunity to highlight the 'imperialist' inclinations of Western policy. This opportunity manifested itself in Lumumba's request for assistance, which the USSR acceded to though not extensively; the provision of Soviet aid, and Lumumba's acceptance of the aid had nonetheless created the conditions for the crisis to exacerbate under the superimposition of the Cold War context as time passed.

The USSR must bear in mind her desire to spread her communist influence and to regain her footing in the silent war against USA.



# KEY GUIDING QUESTIONS

1. What are the factors that feed into a justified intervention by the UN?
2. How justified is normative change to the UN, which follows a strict mandate? Can this mandate afford to be undermined for a greater good?
3. Is the integrity of the notion of peacekeeping fundamentally undermined when the use of force and military intervention comes into play?
4. How important are the superpowers' vested interests, as compared to the welfare of locals?
5. In that vein, how can the tensions between the different agendas of the various superpowers be reconciled, while at the same time paying enough attention to the welfare of the local actors?
6. Why is a unified Congo important to have?
7. How can the negative impacts of value judgement/partiality of a figure of authority (e.g. the Secretary-General) be mitigated?
8. What can else be done, not only to restore order in Congo but also to combat neocolonialism in a newly independent country? (It is important to think about whether neocolonialism is a good or bad driving force for a country as well.)



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